Journal of Economics, Management & Social Science Volume 4 No 3, October 2018, Pg 14 – 26

# DEBT MANAGEMENT AND REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY IN SUB SAHARAN AFRICA (SSA): ISSUES AND INTERVENTIONS

**HENRY, IGIEBOR OGHOATOR *PhD.***
Department of Political Science and Public Administration
Western Delta University
Oghara, Delta State
Nigeria.

**Prof. AKONGBOWA, BRAMWELL AMADASUN**
Department of Public Administration
Federal University Wukari
Wukari, Taraba State
Nigeria.

## ABSTRACT

***The focus is on the level of citizens' participation or voicelessness in the generic policy/legislation formulation, approval, implementation and oversight of the procurement, repayment or repudiation and sustainability or unsustainability of national debt in democratic Sub Saharan Africa with special reference to Nigeria. In this context the paper posits that the whole process is a mockery of representative democracy, largely because of the superlative superiority of legislators' interest over citizens or national interest in managing and supervising national debts expenditure engagements priorities and sustainability. In this context the paper examined among others: the concept of participatory democracy and representative democracy; the historical context of national debt legislations in the context of democratic representation; legislative representation in the context of national debt management; the role of institutions in policy and legislative oversight in the context of weak institutions and strong individuals using the termite governance theory and elite theory as basis for explanation. In addition the paper identified several democratic mechanisms for mismanaging national debt and enacting questionable national debt legislations. The paper also opines that many instruments (accountability/legislative) designed for oversight and sustainability are ineffective and suffers from citizens' ownership flaws. It posits that despite attempts at cosmetic changes the fundamentals for sustainable debt management and oversight (legislative inclusive) constitute actions at the expense of citizens' voice. Having examined these issues in the context of citizens' representation/participation the paper concluded and made policy prescriptions.***

**Keywords: National Debts, Representative Democracy, Citizens, Lagislators, National Interest**

## INTRODUCTION

Public debts of the nations that make up Sub Saharan Africa can be classified into two, namely: domestic debt and external debt". Over the past decades of Sub Saharan African (SSA) nations' post-independence monetary policy, fiscal policy and debt management have not only become a recurring decimal but focused on the prodigality and its unsustainable nature of external debts.

The major actors in this unsustainable debt adventure include: 1. the national governments; 2. the sub-national governments; 3. and recently the too big to fail commercial banks. Historically the origin of Sub Saharan Africa public debt (external) dates back to early 1900.The SSA's external debt has been on the increase since 1970 when it stood at US $ 8.3 Billion. In 1975 it rose to US $ 22.7 Billion. The upward trend continued and in 1995 the SSA's external debt has increased to US $ 223 Billion. At the beginning of this century a lot of debts owed by the SSA countries were canceled, rescheduled or repaid at concessional interest rates. Currently the National debts of some of the states are as follows: South Africa stands at US $ 147 Billion (National Debt Clocks. Org). Other Nations in Sub Sahara Africa debt profile stands as follows: Nigeria US $ 42 Billion, Tanzania US $ 13.7 Billion, Ghana US $ 76.1 Billion, Ethiopia US $ 14 Billion, Angola US $ 22.71 Billion, and Sudan US $ 14.1 Billion. (answersafrica.com).

The World Bank in its report (World Bank, 2017) sums the external debt situation in the SSA as follows:

1. **Sub-Saharan Africa Net debt inflows offset the decline in net equity flows:**

Net financial flows to Sub-Saharan Africa rose 10 percent in 2014, to $78 billion, with a 20 percent drop in net equity flows, more than offset by a 48 percent rise in net debt flows. The decline in net equity flows was driven in large measure by the $3.9 billion outflow of foreign direct investment from Angola and much lower net inflows of portfolio equity to Nigeria. Net debt inflows rose to $47 billion ($31 billion in 2013) of this figure 64 percent were accounted for by private creditors. Around 26 percent of net debt flows to the region went to South Africa: its share of comparable debt flows in 2013 was 11 percent. Net financial inflows to the region, excluding South Africa, fell 3 percent in 2014 with a 23 percent rise in net debt inflows, to $34 billion ($28 billion in 2013), not enough to offset the 23 percent drop in net equity flows.

2. **Long-term debt inflows rose 34 percent with private creditors dominant:**

External borrowing by countries in the region, excluding South Africa, has risen rapidly and been marked by a distinct change in borrowing patterns and creditor composition. Disbursements of long-term debt increased 34 percent in 2014 (to $54 billion), triple the comparable figures for other low- and middle-income countries, with private creditors accounting for 60 percent (50 percent in 2013). Disbursements from private creditors have also become more diversified. In 2010, all long-term private debt was attributable to banks and other private creditors, whereas in 2014, 27 percent was accounted for by bond issuance. Borrowing patterns have also changed with disbursements from private creditors now going primarily to nonguaranteed private-sector borrowers. Disbursements from official creditors (excluding the IMF) rose 30 percent between 2010 and 2013. The momentum continued in 2014 when they rose a further 8 percent to $21.5 billion. This increase was largely attributable to a 14 percent rise in disbursements by multilateral creditors, notably those from the World Bank. Disbursements from IDA, $5 billion in 2014, were unchanged from their 2013 level, but IDA remained by far the single largest multilateral creditor. China was again the continent's most important bilateral creditor.

### 3. Bond issuance booms

Historically, bond issuance in Sub-Saharan Africa was confined to South Africa, but following Ghana's debut issue in 2007, sovereign bond issuance by countries in the region, including those that benefited from HIPC and MDRI debt relief, has been a rapidly rising phenomenon. Benign global market conditions and the investor desire for higher returns have facilitated access to international capital markets. Sovereign borrowers, excluding South Africa, issued $6 billion in 2014, equivalent to 29 percent of disbursements from official creditors and 25 percent of foreign direct investment inflows. The debut sovereign bonds issued by Ethiopia ($1 billion) and Kenya ($2 billion) were massively over-subscribed, and the same applied for countries returning to the market, such as Ghana and Zambia. Proceeds of sovereign bonds are used as benchmark for future government and corporate bond markets issues, to manage the public debt portfolio, and for infrastructure financing. In Ethiopia, the 10-year, 6.625 percent Eurobond issued in December, 2014, is earmarked for development of sugarcane plantations, a hydropower dam, and amelioration and extension of the railway network

Iyoha (1999) posits that Africa's eternal debt is the highest in the world as a proportion of GDP. Majority of the countries in Sub Saharan Africa are spending more than half of their export earnings to service foreign debts. The debts are so large in relation to their foreign exchange earnings potential that it would be impossible to pay them off even if growth is experienced. Largely as a consequence of debt servicing, flow of capital from Africa is significantly more than flow of new capital to the region. According to Iyoha (1999) the excessive stock of external is retarding the growth and hampering the socio-economic development of SSA countries.

Taking Nigeria as chronic debtor nation, her debt profile can be traced back to 1919-1935 under Sir Hugh Clifford and Donald Cameron (both of them Governor General of Nigeria) when they took a loan amounting to 75 million pounds from the British government out of which 14 million pounds was invested in the railways. In 1958 another 28 million pounds was borrowed for railway expansion. In 1978 post independent Nigeria, a relatively under borrowed nation, contracted the first mega loan of 2.8 billion united States dollar from the capital market for balance of payment support, an action she was lured and encouraged into by the Breton woods Institutions (BWI's). Since then it has been a jamboree of loans with huge capital and interest repayment consequences and conditionality from BWIs, particularly the IMF. So much so that as at the 1980s–1990s Nigeria was already negotiating debt forgiveness or repudiation. With a huge debt overhang of USD 32.6 billion in 2005 it negotiated a debt exit of a huge debt repayment of USD 12 billion in 12 months – the first and only one of its kind in global debt repayment till date. From 2005 to date, domestic and the external debts have again climbed to unsustainable height. External debts now stand at USD 11 billion and the domestic debt at USD 56 billion.

As at today the challenges of debt management in Sub Sahara Africa include but not limited to the following:

- Wrong macro-economic policies that encourages fiscal irresponsibility and exchange rate misalignment.
- Illiquidity arising from steep decline in crude oil revenue essentially.
- Policies that deter savings, such as negative real interest rates and decapitating tax policies and rates that reduces investments and encourage capital flight.

- Financing of long term project with short term credit with its attendant repayment default because repayment are due before projects are completed.
- The requirement to service debt is immediate and delays in expenditures and infrastructure can be costly.
- Debt and economic rate of return on investment are not always given adequate consideration e.g in 2012 Zambia had paid Millions of dollars in interest on its US $ 750 Million Eurobond issue before it began to spend the money (www.cnbcafrica.com)
- Volatility of petroleum products and other commodities that form the main base of foreign exchange leading to deterioration, shocks, unfavorable terms of trade and rising foreign interest rates.
- Mismanagement and misappropriation of public funds.
- Decline in the terms of trade
- Uncontrolled fluctuations in export earnings
- Rescheduling and refinancing of SSA's external debts which serves to increase the debt stock.
- High interests rate.

Taking the above discourse into consideration the emerging question and objective is how to significantly scale down these deficits for a sustainable debt overhang through representative democracy or citizens representation? That is expanding the frontiers of debt management to include the citizens instead of the current players that are largely the elites.

In view of the fact that the paper is on illegitimate external debt and representative democracy and citizens' representation, following the introductory section, the rest of the paper is structured as follows:

- Theoretical Framework (Section 2);
- State of Democracy (Section3);
- Citizens Representation and Illegitimacy (Section 4);
- Democratic Representation (Section 5);
- Culture of Integrity and democratic Representation (section 6); and
- Conclusion and Policy Prescription (Section 7).

**THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

This work will be explained by the Governance Termites Theory and the Elites theory. Termite Governance theory propounded by Amadasun and Oghoator (2012) has as its focus the explanation of gross failure of leadership in Economic and Political systems in sub Saharan Africa. This failure the theory explained is liken to the destructive or occupation army behavior of the termite. In the context of the termites and its colony, governance in the SSA are the products of the individual sole drive to dominate the political and economic space at the expense of society's collective interest. Initially the poverty level in the society serves as a spur or catalyst to drive the individuals to attain political and economic height. Having attained this, the individual uses all at his disposal to dubiously sustain himself in the administrative, economic and political space and to engage in destructive competition with his peers. In the process each contestant acquire a strong snag that sees state offices as his loot or booty and the governance, economic and political space a cake that should be shared instead of been baked and also: 1) develop a strong desire and mechanism to align with foreign forces that support his destructive act; and 2) even induce members of his clan (family, friends, communities etc) to also engage in this destructive jamboree; and 3) induce state policies that are supported by state instruments (executive, legislative and judiciary/legal instruments) that support individual plunder of state wealth and capital accumulation (accumulation process inclusive); and to sustain their dominant position in the administrative, economic and political space through repressive state policies and instruments at the expense of state development.

The termite's destructive tendency is constructed in two directions. The first direction indicates that within the colony individual interest is held sacrosanct and must be protected at all cost. This leads us to the second direction, which provides a boundary between their colony and the external environment from which they collect their food or materials. In this external environment the termite with reckless abandon pulls down any food or material items(s) it finds useful to its existence for keeps in its colony. Likening this to the administrative, economic and political acquisition, usurpation and destructive habits of the SSA habits, one can see that they engage in primitive wealth accumulation habits through the protection of their personal habits at all cost, just like the termites that do this to protect the queen and the other queens in the waiting in the colony. The SSA elites engage in this destructive process with a view to accumulate wealth that will outlive them (that is accumulate wealth for their children, and generations yet unborn). In the same way the termites pull down or eat up whatever structure that stands on their way or that they need so too the SSA elites pull down the administrative, economic and political structures that are meant to serve the interest of the society for their selfish interest or personal estate.

Elite theory in the same vain seeks to explain the power relationships in the contemporary society. Elite theory posits that a small minority, consisting of members of the economic elite holds the most power which is independent of a state's democratic elections process. The theory is at variant with the tradition that states that the multitudes of social groups have equal power and instead argues that democracy is a utopian folly (wikipidia.htm). Matias Lopez defines elite as actors controlling resources, occupying key positions and relating through power networks. (Sociopedia.isa)

The relevance of the termite governance theory and elite theory in explaining the debt management problems in SSA is berthed in the fact that both theories are opposed to democratic arrangements where the voice of the people are held. Instead they simply use the people to legitimize their ambitions. Once in power they build colonies for themselves and destroy inadvertently the larger economic space. The theories are opposed to representative democracy as the majority of the people's interest is not represented but the interest of the governing elite are always in the front burner. In the case of debt management in the SSA the elites are responsible for accumulating odious and illegitimate debts as an avenue for the sustenance of their primitive accumulation at the expense of development.

## THE STATE OF DEMOCRACY

The state of democracy is such that voters call upon governments to provide ever growing services. They also are irked about paying for those services but not as much as, when they are not heard or disregarded or no contribution is solicited from them in terms of debt policy formulation and implementation.

In the past, debt overhang debate in the context of development policy was in the domain of the economist whose concern was with fiscal stability, equity or economic efficiency. However, as at today the concern is with how to fathom the linkage between debt overhang and citizens' participation and representative democracy in the context of national development/governance. This dovetails into debt management without representation that demands connection between the way state acquire and use their power and authority (shaped by the way citizens are sidelined in national debt management –a responsive state that respond better to the need of its citizens and second from the capability of the state –determining what needs are, or managing competing interest, in addition to bureaucratic capability to design and implement policies, and to reassure authority (Mick Moore and Jordan Simpson,2007). In this context the state tends to rely on the need to negotiate with or be accountable to the citizens, or to build a capacity to raise and procure debt with a social contract as a core. This raises three broad questions: 1). Does broad public debt affect the development of the state itself by focusing on debt procurement without citizens' representation? 2).How does the public debt affect the citizens? Does the state engage them economically or politically? 3). How does the state and citizens interact with each other over debt procurement and management and the issue of national debt redistribution function? 4). How sound is the accountability mechanism in place and to what extent does this encourage debt non-procurement and repayment compliance or citizens' representation?

Citizens' demand from the state in the public debt equation has become increasingly high in fulfillment of the social contract for the state to pursue development outcomes that are both equitable and sustainable. Consequently the question that should confront debt procurement and management as fiscal instrument in the SSA include where it ought to strategically position itself to align with the citizens' development aspiration in terms of creating jobs for the teeming unemployed youths and lifting millions out of poverty. In this context our public debt management architecture must begin to consider the symmetric relationship between the state and its citizens and what opportunities it can leverage for industrial and rural development and international competition in the current international capitalist hegemony.

## CITIZENS REPRESENTATION AND ILLEGITIMACY

A critical assessment indicate that Sub Sahara Africa's developments have been stalled by mounting unsustainable debt and it is time she engaged a leading process to a development agenda that require a realistic expectation not only on the availability of resources to finance debt anew and real commitment to the concept of citizens participation alongside democratic representation in managing national debt that should generate the positive impact in public funds governance. In this context the emerging questions include;

1. How can Nigeria and the rest of Sub Saharan African States develop a realistic and accurate assessment of the likely debts overhang in the event of debt unsustainability?
1. How can the region develop a concrete understanding of how these debts occur and the level of citizens' participation in debt procurement?
2. How do we ensure that practical, realistic short- to medium-term actions are engaged in addressing debt crisis and the issue of democratic representation vis-a-vis citizens' participation?

3. How do we accurately identify the critical ingredients and the technical capacity in citizens' participation and national debt management?

An overview of Nigeria's debt and the rest of the Sub Saharan Africa in the past 50 years indicate that the exact volume remain a guess work. However one fact remains incontrovertible. It is that because of the non-engagement of the citizens, the procurement process and the massive corruption associated with the debt procurement a substantial portion of the public debt can be classified as illegitimate.

In the 60 years of post independent SSA both civilian and military leaders have been implicated or alleged to have been involved in the looting of the regions external loans with a sizeable proportion been illegitimate. For example for Nigeria what this means is that Nigerian taxpayers where deprived of the loan benefits. For 28 years Nigeria was ruled by eight dictatorial and unelected military regimes. For another 28 years Nigeria was ruled by elected civilian regimes. The civilian regimes procure external loan through representative democracy in pseudo democratic process that was laced with looting and "insider arrangements" that makes the procurement illegitimate and questionable. The military regimes in Nigeria pro-actively contributed to the external debt crisis by acts of omission and commission through massive procurements of external usurious loans that did not serve public interest and lacked citizens' approval. The argument is that Nigerian foreign loans were misappropriated by her corrupt civilian and military regimes, this was also the case in several other SSA states, and consequently they have become illegitimate. Besides, the lending by International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and sovereign governments in the West and elsewhere have been to incompetent and/or corrupt regimes, collaborating in the failure of the loans to deliver in the targeted projects and dividends to SSA Citizens, thus making the loans illegitimate.

**DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION**

Taking a look at the current sham method of interactions between the executive, the legislature and the electorate or citizens a long term policy approach towards identifying and analyzing the efforts made to apply an interface in external debt management on development policy and operation. An evaluation of the complexity, timing and different types of pressure that affects policy formulation and implementation in national debt negotiation and management, within the context of representative democracy, indicate a non-existent or sham architecture. This brings to the fore the need for the recognition that policy coherence and input transformation or productivity for sustainable debt development alignment and complementarity are possible outcomes of participatory debt management, democratic representation and institutional coordination.

What obtains in terms of legislative approval and oversight of loan procurement and repayment in the Sub Saharan African region is a mockery of representative democracy, largely because of the superlative superiority of legislators' interest over citizens or national interest in managing and supervising national debts expenditure engagements, priorities and sustainability. The legislative process for approving and supervising the loans in most cases sidelined citizens' participation. In addition the whole process suffers from the defects of representative democracy.

Essentially illegitimate debts can be classified as debt incurred and creditors acting illegitimately (AFRODAD 2005):

- The debt is odious because the loans were contracted to service the interest of the leaders and not the state.
- The debt arouse as a result of looting of the contracted loans through corruption.
- The debt was from the on start contracted for fraudulent purposes

There are three necessary conditions for a debt to be considered odious. This raises the question of what happened to legislative oversight that is being exercised by the legislators on behalf of the citizens. This can be gleaned from the characteristics of odious debt:

1. The debt must not have received the consent of the nation. The question here is where is the legislative oversight when the consent of the nation was been sidelined?
2. The loan contracted and spent in a manner that is contrary to the interest of the nation. The emerging question is who authorized the loan and in what manner and process? Did it conflict with the doctrine of representative democracy?
3. The creditors must be aware of these. The question is was the creditors aware that they were lending into a situation where both the loan and the purpose was not approved by the electorate or citizens?

The doctrine of odious debts place morality on the part of both the national oversight institutions (particularly the National Assembly and the IFIs) and make them more responsible for the purpose for which the loan is engaged (Patricia Adams, 1991). Recognizing and preventing odious or illegitimate debt provide the fundamentals for eliminating moral hazards that has so dominated the social, economic and political life of the region. Besides there is need for a shift in negotiating power from citizens, lenders that should take greater care to lend to government with real authority, and not just apparent authority, and to exercise due diligence to make sure that money is used for legitimate government purposes, providing a basis for accountable public finance that citizens and the legislature have so thoughtfully articulated. This will no doubt force lenders to demand evidence that the borrowing public (legislative) inclusive is aware of and consents to its government borrowing before extending credit

**CULTURE OF INTEGRITY AND DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION**

The culture of integrity remains a critical element in sustainable public debt management both by the executive and the National Assembly. The absence of integrity opens up the possibility of corruption, self-interest, favoritism and inappropriate personal interests to dominate the whole process. In this context some of the main component of integrity in sustainable public live should include official decision making and public conduct must be free from undue personal interest. Public decision must show no evidence of partiality or favoritism and officials must respect the public trust interest in their office (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2001).

The emerging issue here is that government should support a culture of integrity that demands that political leader nurture a culture of integrity. However the emerging question in terms of sustainable debt management includes: how feasible is it for governments in sub Saharan Africa to take on the sole responsibility for cultivating the appropriate social culture? What about the civil society (family, schools, the professionals, the churches and the media)?

To ensure a public participation and a productive democratic representation in public debt management the under listed should be activated (Common wealth Secretariat, 2001):

1. The problem of the size of the nation: strategies that are feasible for smaller nations are not necessarily feasible for large wealthier nations. Consequently decentralization and devolution of national debts debates can be appropriate prerequisite for accountability of legislators to the electorate for the debt management.
2. The problem of patronage: This can be seen from the angle of competition. It takes considerable political leadership to turn patterns of patronage in the direction of culture of integrity architecture which should be put in place that will ensure social recognition of public officials (particularly the legislators) that hold offices of trust designed to promote wider interests of the citizens and narrow parochial interest of particular individuals or group.
3. The problem of secrecy: Democratic government involves a balance between the value of efficiency and equity. The balance works best where transparency is in place and requires public officials (legislators inclusive) conduct public business openly and honestly as possible in addition to planning flow of government public debt management decisions in institutions that value the integrity and transparency. Above all there must be in place a culture of check and balance as an important requirement for integrity in the context of democratic representation in public debts management.
4. The problem of party: Political parties are essentially for democratic self-government and that loyalty to party can get in the way of public integrity in terms of public loan management. This is largely because party representatives in public offices do not understand or care that public offices are part of a large system of public trust. The truth is that office holders have a conditional right to exercise their powers of office, so long as they comply with the public obligations attached to the offices and use of their offices primarily to provide the public interest before any party interest. It is essential to state that parliamentary check on the executive is important but within the context of parliamentary responsibility to the electorate. It is only on this ground that the importance of public awareness of the need for and support of an active and questioning legislature. Parliamentary select committees such as public debts committee, public accounts committee etc are powerful methods for ensuring accountability by the executive, provided there is no connivance and compromise at the expense of the citizens/electorate. Committees should have wide powers for calling for evidence whether from public officials or semi- autonomy agencies.

To Foster a culture of citizens participation, debt negotiation should move towards achieving of greater coherence in the context of sustainable national debts management; there should be increasing recognition of the importance of interface between the parliament and the citizens. Both sub-regional and regional supra-national agencies should help close coloration in this regard on how to tackle external debts in a context – sensitive way, with a view to serve as food for thought for member states and regional institutions that has to do with debt management for further consideration.

Essentially there is growing evidence of piecemeal approaches to promoting citizens, legislatures and executive interaction in external debt Procurement and repayment. However, there is also lack of clarity as to what type of impact is being sought by the mechanisms that were created to promote these interactions with little attention given to result oriented evaluation of this interface. Besides, another issue revolves around what the systematic approach to promoting citizens, legislatures and executive interface for debt procurement and repayment is.

Promoting this interface should be a work in progress that requires a continuing broad based (cross party) political support by sub regional and regional supra-national institutions with a view to completing and ensuring the long term impact of the measures taken in the loan procurement and repayment.

It is necessary to state that in order to strengthen or bring about this interface, coordinated efforts among regional and sub-regional supra national institutions regarding capacity building has increased but the effects on complementarity and coherence in policy decision involving the executive, Legislators and citizens have so far been disappointing. This is largely due to lack of reliance to developing a common policy by the supra-national bodies that could put pressure on national governments and their institutions. Though to an extent institutional coordination mechanism exists in the nation states of the region–such as communities, joint planning frameworks etc, which when formally mandated and used offer a potential for encouraging the interactions.

**CONCLUSION AND POLICY PRESCRIPTION**

Taking the above into cognizance, long term process–oriented perspective that should dominate loans negotiation and management in the SSA should be that which revolves round moving towards the application particular precepts of policy in such a complex executive, legislature interface that requires some form of institutional coordination, formal or informal at different levels. Levels of coordination may be within the AU; sub regional organizations; with international partners; civil society; or between creditor partner countries; or it may address a region, a sector of sub-sector. The interface can focus on different priorities, address different teams and done with different degrees of insensitive.

Typically, a coordination process directed towards improving democratic representation and citizens participation effectiveness might start by sharing information and then, increasingly moving towards identifying issues of common interest, setting a joint agenda the exchange of good practices and joint decision making. After that, it may move further towards joint evaluation monitoring, joint learning, harmonization of procedures and perhaps, the setting of new rules and institutions for interactions. Such an institutional coordination process needs to be managed; it does not generally occur spontaneously, even mostly informal. It requires not only the political will of the actors to proceed, but also the institutional structures to carry it through.

Given the evolving nature of the sham political relationships between the citizen and the legislature the complicities of policy process within the SSA, it should be clear from the start that evaluation of the current sham arrangement of legislative, executive and citizens interactions would produce a self interest dominate parliament as against national interest dominate debt management strategy parliament in the SSA countries whose impact is disappointing. Consequently there arises a number of specific process oriented questions:

1. What steps the relevant actors take individually or jointly, to improve coherence, complementarity and / or co-ordination between the executive, legislature and the citizens?
2. Which if any, enabling mechanism and /or frame works be used or put into place to produce a relevant and productive interaction?
3. What result will be achieved, intentionally or unintentionally? Why, and Why not?
4. What constraints or opportunities will actors encounter why implementing their actions/mechanisms?

So far, constraints seem to outnumber incentives in the quest for democratic representation and citizens participations. Coordination mechanisms often lack an exploit, formal and operationally focused mandate, and often limited to rhetoric of collaboration and cooperation between the legislature and the electorate rather than to joint assessment and decision making that is binding on all the executives.

Sub Saharan Africa's external debt from all indication is unsustainable. In addition the process by which they are been contracted is unsustainable because of the pseudo nature of the application of the doctrine of democratic representation to debt procurement and repayment. This has not only provided the sham basis for the borrowed funds to be looted but also circumvented the process for legislative approval and supervision. Finally most of our national debt largely remain illegitimate and should be considered separately from the other debts. What this demands is that the process for citizens participation and democratic participation must be strengthened with a view to expanding the frontiers as follows:

1. Give citizens affected by the debt issue a legal right to have their voices heard in the debt procurement and repayment.
2. Ensuring freedom of information, transparency and accountability to the public is central to the debt procurement and repayment process.
3. Adhere that all loans be sanctioned by the National Assembly and citizens participation.
4. Establish a medium for sincere dialogue with the citizens before loans are contracted.
5. Monitor government external borrowing and debt.
6. Sub Saharan African Nations must expand the frontiers of debt management by allowing for greater citizens participation through effective representative democracy as is the practice in most western democracies.

**REFERENCES**

African Forum and Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD)(2005); The Illegitimacy of External Debts. Manila: AFRODAD, Pp.8-10.

Amadasun, B.A and Oghoator, H.I (2012) "Termite Governance Theory" https://Patnet2012.files.wordpress.com

Commonwealth Secretariat (2001); Accountability, Scrutiny and Oversight. London: Commonwealth Accountability workshop held in Canberra.

Iyoha M.A (1999) "External Debt and Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan African Countries: An Econometric Study" Publication of African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) Research Paper 90 Nairobi.

Matias L, (Elitetheory.pdf.Sociopidia.isa) Cited January 15 2017

Patricia Adams (1991), Loose Lending, Corruption and the Third World's Environmental Legacy. London: Earth Scan, P.165.

World Bank Group (2017), External Debts Data on Sub Saharan Africa, in International Debt Statistics. Washington D.C.: World Bank Group. P.13.

www.cnbcafrica.com/africas-debt-rising. Cited January 15 2017.

www.answersafrica.com/debt. Cited January 20 2017

www.wikipidia/document/elitetheory.htm. Cited January 15 2017

**Appendix 1**

| Country | Public debt as % of GDP (CIA)[1] | Date | Total(Gross) government debt as % of GDP (IMF) | Net government debt as % of GDP (IMF)[2] | Date | Region |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Benin | 40.2 | 2016 | 30.867 | | 2014 | Africa |
| Botswana | 21.0 | 2016 | 14.450 | | 2014 | Africa |
| Burkina Faso | | | 28.321 | | 2014 | Africa |
| Burundi | 43.4 | 2016 | 30.541 | | 2014 | Africa |
| Cameroon | 31.1 | 2016 | 23.932 | | 2014 | Africa |
| Cape Verde | 116.8 | 2016 | 112.199 | 107.691 | 2014 | Africa |
| Central African Republic | | | 41.830 | | 2014 | Africa |
| Chad | 35.4 | 2016 | 24.983 | | 2014 | Africa |
| Comoros | | | 19.953 | 19.953 | 2014 | Africa |
| Congo, Democratic Republic of the | 18.2 | 2016 | 19.691 | | 2014 | Africa |
| Congo, Republic of the | 49.3 | 2016 | 42.295 | | 2014 | Africa |
| Cote d'Ivoire | 50.9 | 2016 | 36.414 | | 2014 | Africa |
| Djibouti | 38.6 | 2012 | 38.618 | | 2012 | Africa |
| Equatorial Guinea | 24.3 | 2016 | 8.177 | 8.177 | 2012 | Africa |
| Eritrea | 119.8 | 2016 | 125.785 | | 2012 | Africa |
| Ethiopia | 54.2 | 2016 | 21.551 | 18.172 | 2012 | Africa |
| Gabon | 43.5 | 2016 | 21.999 | | 2012 | Africa |
| Gambia, The | | | 77.179 | 77.179 | 2012 | Africa |
| Guinea | | | 42.993 | 42.993 | 2012 | Africa |
| Guinea-Bissau | | | 59.751 | | 2012 | Africa |
| Kenya | 50.4 | 2016 | 48.185 | 43.167 | 2012 | Africa |
| Lesotho | 53.4 | 2015 | 41.903 | -2.141 | 2012 | Africa |
| Liberia | 11.8 | 2016 | 29.076 | -8.254 | 2012 | Africa |
| Libya | 10.0 | 2016 | 0 | -95.035 | 2012 | Africa |
| Madagascar | | | 38.309 | | 2012 | Africa |
| Malawi | 61.2 | 2016 | 54.903 | 51.15 | 2012 | Africa |
| Mali | 27.3 | 2016 | 32.003 | 26.881 | 2012 | Africa |
| Mozambique | 100.3 | 2016 | 46.628 | | 2012 | Africa |
| Namibia | 35.6 | 2016 | 26.642 | 24.411 | 2012 | Africa |
| Niger | | | 31.051 | 4.25 | 2012 | Africa |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nigeria | 13.2 | 2016 | 17.762 | 13.283 | 2012 | Africa |
| Rwanda | 36.6 | 2016 | 28.040 | | 2012 | Africa |
| Sao Tome and Principe | 89.5 | 2016 | 75.503 | | 2012 | Africa |
| Senegal | 55.6 | 2016 | 45.002 | | 2012 | Africa |
| Seychelles | 59.1 | 2016 | 82.528 | 69.482 | 2012 | Africa |
| Sierra Leone | 43.3 | 2016 | 44.471 | 0 | 2012 | Africa |
| South Africa | 43.3 | 2016 | 42.282 | 35.561 | 2012 | Africa |
| Sudan | 68.8 | 2016 | 97.642 | | 2012 | Africa |
| Swaziland | | | 19.041 | 7.607 | 2012 | Africa |
| Togo | 63.3 | 2016 | 46.706 | | 2012 | Africa |
| Uganda | 35.4 | 2016 | 34.532 | | 2012 | Africa |
| Zambia | 57.2 | 2016 | 26.875 | 23.517 | 2012 | Africa |
| Zimbabwe | 45.4 | 2016 | 60.451 | | 2012 | Africa |